Notes on the rise of the far right and authoritarianism in Brazil and the role of civil society in dark times.
The article details the measures and policies adopted by Jair Bolsonaro’s government in Brazil between 2019 and 2022, and some of the strategies implemented by civil society to resist authoritarianism and confront the pillars that enable and structure it, such as racism and colonialism. The authors also explain that the former president’s electoral defeat and his subsequent conviction and imprisonment for an attempted coup d’état did not eliminate the authoritarian risk, which must still be confronted by going beyond a reactive stance and by deepening democracy.
On January 2, 2019, less than 24 hours after assuming the presidency of the Republic of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro published a provisional presidential decree11. Presidency of the Republic of Brazil, Provisional Presidential Measure No. 870, January 1, 2019, accessed October 17, 2025, https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2019/mpv/mpv870.htm. which would set the tone for his relationship with civil society in general, and with the human rights movement in particular. In the text, the retired Army captain, the eighth president since the country’s redemocratization after the Military Dictatorship (1964-1985), gave the Secretariat of Government of the Presidency the task of “supervising, coordinating, monitoring and following up on the activities and actions of international organizations and non-governmental organizations in the national territory”—an unequivocal move to curtail and intimidate these organizations.
The publication of this provisional measure was exemplary in many ways. First, because it fulfilled a campaign promise and an anti-NGO speech22. “Cerca de 3 mil entidades repudiam Bolsonaro por fala sobre fim do ativismo no Brasil,” Conectas Human Rights, October 15, 2018, accessed January 13, 2025, https://conectas.org/noticias/cerca-de-3-mil-entidades-repudiam-bolsonaro-por-fala-sobre-fim-do-ativismo-no-brasil/. that Bolsonaro had shamelessly cultivated in interviews, live broadcasts, and online publications, throughout his 17 years as a federal deputy. It also echoed one of the favorite items on the agenda of the far-right international alliance of which the president and his closest family and political circle had become a part. Second, because it was an example of the type of strategy that the government would employ in the four years that followed, to reverse rights, override the law, and impose unconstitutional agendas in multiple areas. Finally, and most importantly, because this was one of Bolsonaro’s initiatives that was successfully blocked by civil society through a large mobilization campaign called Free Society,33. “Campanha pressiona Congresso a reverter MP de controle de ONGs,” Conectas Human Rights, April 24, 2019, accessed November 24, 2025, https://conectas.org/noticias/campanha-mp-controle-de-ongs/. under the leadership of the Pact for Democracy network, of which Conectas is a part.
This article addresses the mechanisms through which the Bolsonaro project was implemented in Brazil between 2019 and 2022, with consequences that still reverberate in Brazilian society. It also presents some of the strategies that worked in resisting authoritarianism in the country. This effort emerges from the need, identified and shared by Conectas and other organizations in different spaces over the last six years, including the International Colloquium on Human Rights, to articulate common horizons of resistance to authoritarianism and to confront the pillars that enable and structure it, such as racism and colonialism; furthermore, to promote a positive agenda for the field of human rights anchored in the practices and knowledge forged in the Global South.
The election of Jair Bolsonaro was the culmination of a movement that had been developing for years in the Brazilian political landscape. Bolsonaro, a low-ranking politician who has never hidden his disdain for democracy and human rights, successfully articulated both the interests of the political and economic elite whose priority was to maintain and deepen the ultraliberal policies implemented during Michel Temer’s term and the demands of a society increasingly influenced by religious conservatism and the anti-establishment discourse that had been gaining strength. This process unfolded against the backdrop of an unequivocal strengthening of international far-right alliances, which had translated into the rise of authoritarian governments across the globe. Bolsonaro had everything he needed to ride this wave.
The 2018 election campaign reflected the deep division in Brazilian society, with numerous cases of violence against journalists, activists, and candidates.44. Alexsandro Ribeiro, Carolina Zanatta, Caroline Farah, Gabriele Roza, José Lázaro Jr., Mariana Simões, Thays Lavor e Bruno Fonseca, “Violência eleitoral recrudesceu no segundo turno,” Agência Pública, November 12, 2018, accessed October 18, 2025, https://apublica.org/2018/11/violencia-eleitoral-recrudesceu-no-segundo-turno/. Bolsonaro himself was the victim of a serious stabbing during a rally. Despite the emphatic condemnation of the attack by other competing candidates and investigations revealing that the perpetrator had no connection to them, Bolsonaro did not hesitate to exploit the episode to heighten the rhetoric and escalate tensions. Just one week before the second round of elections, in a video call broadcast to thousands of his supporters and demonstrators across the country, Bolsonaro promised to “banish” the “red outlaws” from the homeland through a “broad cleanup.” And he continued: “if they want to stay here, they’ll have to submit to the same law as all of us. Either they leave, or they go to jail.”55. Poder 360, “Jair Bolsonaro fala por telefone com os manifestantes da Av. Paulista,” You Tube, October 22, 2018, accessed October 16, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vxX3nQccTU. The violence was both physical and rhetorical.66. Conectas Human Rights and partner organizations reacted to Bolsonaro’s speeches and actions against civil society long before he took office as president. One example is the letter signed by more than three thousand Brazilian organizations against a statement he made in October 2018 that, if elected, he would put “an end to all activism in Brazil.” See “Cerca de 3 mil entidades repudiam Bolsonaro por fala sobre fim do ativismo no Brasil,” Conectas Human Rights, October 15, 2018, accessed November 24, 2025, https://conectas.org/noticias/cerca-de-3-mil-entidades-repudiam-bolsonaro-por-fala-sobre-fim-do-ativismo-no-brasil/.
This brief outline shows that Brazilian civil society was able to see and interpret the signs of Jair Bolsonaro’s rise—and anticipate the consequences of his victory—well in advance of his inauguration in January 2019. The degree of danger was known. There were no surprises regarding his discourse, always consistent in his rejection of the rights agenda, nor regarding the government plan, which had been publicized and advocated by him and his cabinet long before the start of the election campaign (most of the ministers, twenty men and two women, were confirmed more than a month before the inauguration). The experience of countries like Hungary under Viktor Orbán, with whom Bolsonaro has always maintained a close relationship, also served as an important source of learning.
Time and knowledge allowed organizations to plan, renegotiate priorities—including with funders and partners—and implement security measures that would prove indispensable in the four years that followed. They also provided opportunities for organizations to connect and build new forms of collaboration and strategies to resist setbacks—which, as demonstrated in the example of the provisional presidential measure mentioned at the beginning of the text, would soon materialize.
On January 8, 2023, a crowd stormed and attacked the headquarters of the three branches of government in Brasília. Lula had just taken office and Jair Bolsonaro, who did not expressly acknowledge the election results, refused to hand over the presidential sash. Furthermore, he had traveled to the United States before the official end of his term. The coup and anti-democratic acts, as would be proven throughout the investigations and the criminal proceedings that resulted in the conviction of the now former president in September 2025, were part of a plan to keep him in power and also involved the kidnapping of a Supreme Court Justice, as well as the assassination of Lula and his vice-president, Geraldo Alckmin.77. In September 2025, Jair Bolsonaro was sentenced to 27 years in prison for the crimes of armed criminal organization, attempted violent abolition of the Democratic Rule of Law, coup d’état, aggravated damage through violence and serious threats, and deterioration of listed heritage. It was a lamentable and shocking end to a government marked by contempt for democracy, institutions, and the Constitution.
During his four years in power, Bolsonaro placed Brazil’s democratic rule of law in a permanent state of crisis. This crisis involved the extinction of spaces for action and participation by civil society88. In 2019, Jair Bolsonaro signed a decree that reduced the number of councils foreseen by the National Policy for Social Participation (PNPS) and the National System for Social Participation (SNPS) from 700 to less than 50. See BRAZIL, Decree No. 9759, of April 11, 2019. This Decree extinguishes and establishes guidelines, rules and limitations for collegiate bodies of the direct, autonomous and foundational federal public administration. Accessed January 22, 2026, https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2019-2022/2019/decreto/d9759.htm. in different areas of public administration; the abusive use of legal and repressive apparatuses to intimidate opponents and silence critical voices;99. According to a survey by LAUT – Center for Analysis of Freedom and Authoritarianism, in the first two years of the Bolsonaro government there was a 285% increase in the opening of investigations based on the National Security Law compared to the same period of the Dilma and Michel Temer governments. See “Diagnóstico da aplicação atual da Lei de Segurança Nacional,” Centro de Análise da Liberdade e do Autoritatismo, May 22, 2021, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/promulgada-pela-ditadura-militar-lei-de-seguranca-nacional-e-revogada/. the co-opting of state agencies1010. Conectas denounced the Bolsonaro government at the UN for threatening the global climate, especially for its attacks on the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA). See “Governo Bolsonaro é denunciado na ONU por ameaçar o clima global e violar direitos humanos no Brasil,” Conectas Human Rights, November 16, 2022, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/governo-bolsonaro-e-denunciado-na-onu-por-ameacar-o-clima-global-e-violar-direitos-humanos-no-brasil/. and law enforcement bodies;1111. Actions have been taken to weaken the Palmares Cultural Foundation and other bodies that protect the rights of quilombola communities, for example. See “Governo fragiliza todas as ações que fortalecem nossa vida e nossos quilombos”, diz coordenador da Conaq,” Conectas Human Rights, August 10, 2022, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/o-governo-tem-fragilizado-todas-as-acoes-que-fortalecem-nossa-vida-e-nossos-quilombos-diz-coordenador-da-conaq/. restrictions on access to public information;1212. In 2020, a provisional measure was published outlining measures to address the public health emergency, which included suspending responses to requests for access to information. See “Organizações repudiam medida que suspende atendimento a pedido de acesso à informação”, Conectas Human Rights, March 24, 2020, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/organizacoes-repudiam-medida-que-suspende-atendimento-a-pedido-de-acesso-a-informacao/. and the promotion of verbal and institutional attacks on the press and civil society. Of note, for example, was the appointment of an employee of the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin), whose identity was protected, to coordinate the body within the Government Secretariat responsible for relations with social organizations.1313. The appointment was suspended by the Federal Court in response to a Public Civil Action filed by Conectas. See “Bolsonaro quer suspender prazos de MPs. Quais os riscos para a democracia?”, Conectas Human Rights, June 20, 2020, accessed November 25, 2025.https://conectas.org/noticias/suspensa-nomeacao-de-agente-da-abin-relacao-com-ongs.
In terms of structure, the Bolsonarist project also included a war on the system of checks and balances of democracy,1414. In light of the coronavirus pandemic, the Bolsonaro government requested that the Supreme Federal Court consider suspending the deadline for the National Congress to analyze Provisional Measures. See Bolsonaro quer suspender prazos de MPs. Quais os riscos para a democracia?”, Conectas Human Rights, April 15, 2020, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/bolsonaro-quer-suspender-prazos-de-mps-quais-os-riscos-para-a-democracia/. using strategies to personalize and direct the hatred of their supporters against authorities in the Legislative and Judicial branches.1515. Jair Bolsonaro launched attacks against the Judiciary in August 2021, instigating institutional instability. See “Organizações repudiam ataques de Bolsonaro ao Judiciário,” Conectas Human Rights, August 24, 2021, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/organizacoes-repudiam-ataques-de-bolsonaro-ao-judiciario/. The most notorious targets of this war were Rodrigo Maia, then president of the Chamber of Deputies, and Minister Alexandre de Moraes, of the Supreme Federal Court. The tension was not merely rhetorical and resulted in the approval of a drastic change in the rule governing the distribution of Brazil’s federal budget, which increased the relative power of Congress in the structure of the Republic and, indirectly, guaranteed the expansion of the number of representatives consistently loyal to Bolsonaro in the Chamber of Deputies (a bloc that currently comprises 363 parliamentarians out of 513).
During the Covid-19 pandemic, the federal government denied scientific evidence, refused to adopt measures to protect the population and address the health crisis, delayed the purchase of vaccines, and even promoted the use of treatments with no proven efficacy. The country recorded more than 700,000 deaths, the second highest number in the world, behind only the United States.1616. World Health Organization, “Number of COVID-19 deaths reported to WHO (cumulative total),” September 28, 2025, accessed September 25, 2025, https://data.who.int/dashboards/covid19/deaths?n=o.
Control over civil society was also increased through the use of surveillance software1717. Harpia Tech, the company responsible for the service, won a tender from the Ministry of Justice for the contracting of espionage services. See “Entidades questionam no TCU contratação de software de espionagem”, Conectas Human Rights, August 9, 2021, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/entidades-questionam-no-tcu-contratacao-de-software-de-espionagem/. and monitoring platforms,1818. The Cortex platform, managed by the Ministry of Justice in 2022, aggregated more than 160 databases and could be used by federal agencies and police forces. See “Entidades pedem que MPF investigue sistema de vigilantismo do governo Bolsonaro”, Conectas Human Rights, February 10, 2022, accessed January 22, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/entidades-pedem-que-mpf-investigue-sistema-de-vigilantismo-do-governo-bolsonaro/. and through manipulation by the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin), which set up a clandestine unit focused on spying on political figures, journalists, and celebrities deemed to be adversaries. During the pandemic, the government implemented mechanisms for collecting personal data (including biometric and geolocation data) in a disorganized and hasty manner, and deployed the state apparatus—including the Ministry of Justice, the Federal Police, and the Institutional Security Office—to persecute political opponents under the infamous National Security Law, inherited from the Military Dictatorship. The law was revoked during the Bolsonaro years and replaced by the Law for the Defense of the Democratic Rule of Law1919. “Promulgada pela ditadura militar, Lei de Segurança Nacional é revogada,” Conectas Human Rights, September 2, 2021, accessed November 25, 2025, https://conectas.org/noticias/promulgada-pela-ditadura-militar-lei-de-seguranca-nacional-e-revogada/. following technical advocacy by civil society, in which Conectas played a significantly active role.2020. Conectas was even mentioned in news reports released by the Senate. See “Relator quer votar revogação da Lei de Segurança Nacional antes do recesso,” Agência Senado, June 25, 2021, accessed January 22, 2026, https://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2021/06/25/relator-quer-votar-revogacao-da-lei-de-seguranca-nacional-antes-do-recesso. There was also an attempt to expand “anti-terrorism” legislation,2121. “Especialista da ONU manifesta preocupação com projetos de lei sobre antiterrorismo no Brasil,” Conectas Human Rights, April 14, 2022, accessed February 2, 2026, https://conectas.org/noticias/especialista-da-onu-manifesta-preocupacao-com-projetos-de-lei-sobre-antiterrorismo-no-brasil/. creating mechanisms for surveillance and the criminalization of civil society organizations and social movements.2222. “Relatório entregue à República Federativa do Brasil referente à RPU Defesa da Sociedade Civil,” Article 19, Conectas Human Rights, March 31, 2022, accessed January 22, 2026, https://www.conectas.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Relatorio-RPU-Defesa-da-Sociedade-Civil.pdf. Furthermore, in this context, we have seen a convergence of interests between the political and economic power of Big Tech companies, which has manifested itself in the difficulty of expanding regulation and curbing the spread of hate speech and disinformation on social media.
Another major front on which Bolsonarism advanced relentlessly, also predictably, was attacking the hard-won rights of minorities and/or historically vulnerable groups in Brazil: a set of agendas to roll back hard-won sexual and reproductive rights that occupied a significant part of the public debate, in the wake of the strengthening of conservative religious leadership.2323. “Ofensivas antigênero no Brasil: políticas de Estado, legislação, mobilização social,” Ação Educativa, Associação Brasileira de Gays, Lésbicas, Bissexuais, Travestis, Transexuais e Intersexos (ABGLT), Associação Nacional de Travestis e Transexuais, Conectas, et al., October 2021, accessed November 25, 2025, https://conectas.org/publicacao/ofensivas-antigenero-no-brasil/. In the very first year of his term, for example, among the various councils abolished by the government was the CNCD/LGBT (National Council to Combat LGBT+ Discrimination)—an entity formed by representatives of the government and civil society to present demands and monitor the implementation of policies in the area. Another measure with important repercussions in this field was the issuance of a decree that made it mandatory for doctors to report suspected cases of rape to the police, which in practice made abortion even more difficult in cases permitted by law in Brazil.2424. Abortion is criminalized in Brazil, and the only three exceptions provided for by law are in cases of risk to the life of the pregnant person, rape, and fetal anencephaly. The decree published by the Bolsonaro government was revoked in 2023. In this context, there was also a correct assessment, developed in dialogue with the Black movement, that it would be central to protect affirmative action policies in higher education. The strategy adopted proved successful, since it was already widely understood by civil society that the Bolsonaro project, due to its authoritarian nature, was also intrinsically racist.
Predictably, this myriad of setbacks had a disproportionate impact on historically vulnerable populations in Brazil: Indigenous peoples, quilombola communities, Black and marginalized populations, migrant workers, the LGBTQIA+ population, and women and children experienced greater exposure to Bolsonaro’s policies and suffered the consequences more profoundly. One example is the sociodemographic profile of the main victims of Covid-19, who were especially neglected by Bolsonaro. According to data from the Mortality Information System (SIM) of the Ministry of Health, in all age groups between 0 and 69 years, Black and mixed-race people died more than white people.2525. According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the predominance of Black and mixed-race people among Covid-19 victims is not observed in the age group from 70 onwards “due to the lower life expectancy of this social group.” “Homens pretos e pardos morreram mais de Covid do que brancos em 2020”, Agência IBGE, December 3, 2021, accessed October 16, 2025, https://agenciadenoticias.ibge.gov.br/agencia-noticias/2012-agencia-de-noticias/noticias/32414-homens-pretos-e-pardos-morreram-mais-de-covid-do-que-brancos-em-2020.
The context of a permanent state of crisis also served to keep other historic and ongoing sources of human rights violations intact. During Bolsonaro’s years in the Presidency, large companies continued to put human rights at risk through their operations. Conflicts in the countryside, generally stemming from mining, agribusiness, mega-constructions, and illegal deforestation, continued to claim victims throughout the territory, especially among the indigenous population.2626. Conectas has taken action to combat these actions, such as ADPF 709. See: “ADPF-709: plano de ação para povos indígenas,” Conectas Human Rights, July 7, 2020, accessed February 2, 2026, https://conectas.org/litigiopt/adpf-709-plano-de-acao-para-povos-indigenas/. In addition, violent police actions were supported and encouraged. For example, the government promoted lenient bills that effectively authorized serious abuses by security agents. Through decrees, ordinances, and bills, the Executive Branch promoted a complete dismantling of the country’s gun control policy, expanding access and disorganizing the control of weapons and ammunition. This contributed to an increase in violence in the country.
Similarly, the Bolsonaro government denied the climate emergency, dismantled environmental protection policies, and gutted agencies responsible for ensuring compliance with legislation regarding environmental licensing, deforestation, and the protection of indigenous lands, such as the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (Ibama) and the National Foundation for Indigenous Peoples (Funai). The erosion of governance in the socio-environmental and climate spheres was meticulously planned and implemented, and included cuts in budget, personnel, and resources in key ministries which were also weakened. In addition, there was a failure to investigate and ensure accountability for environmental crimes and violence directed at defenders; the environmental and human rights legal and regulatory framework was dismantled; public access to information was limited; civil society was excluded from governance; and civil society and the press experienced repression.2727. “Lacunas de governança socioambiental no Brasil: Utilizando o processo de acessão à OCDE para fortalecer os direitos humanos e a proteção ambiental,” OECD Watch, Conectas Human Rights, International Federation for Human Rights, March 2022, accessed November 25, 2025, https://www.oecdwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2022/03/Bridging-Brazilian-governance-gaps-Research-series-summary-paper-PT-1.pdf. Bolsonaro’s ministerial team became notorious for lacking the qualities and skills needed to lead their respective portfolios. The former Minister of the Environment, Ricardo Salles, for example, is currently facing proceedings related to the illegal export of timber.2828. “STF vai julgar Ricardo Salles por suposto esquema de facilitação de contrabando de produtos florestais,” Suélen Pires, September 1, 2025, accessed January 22, 2026, https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-vai-julgar-ricardo-salles-por-suposto-esquema-de-facilitacao-de-contrabando-de-produtos-florestais/.
The clientelist alliance between Bolsonaro and the Legislative branch, consolidated under Arthur Lira’s presidency of the Chamber of Deputies starting in 2021, also enabled the approval of legislative changes and constitutional amendments that favored the implementation of a regressive agenda, legalizing previously unlawful measures, even after the end of Bolsonaro’s presidency. This continuity became evident, for example, in the approval of the bill that consolidated the “time frame” thesis—a mechanism to limit the demarcation of indigenous lands.2929. The “Time Frame” Framework Law was approved by Congress in 2023, already under Lula’s government, in response to the Supreme Federal Court’s decision to declare the thesis unconstitutional. The text was vetoed by the president, but the veto was later overturned by parliamentarians. The thesis establishes that the right to territory should only be granted to indigenous peoples who prove that they occupied or claimed their lands on the date the Federal Constitution was promulgated (October 5, 1988), ignoring the violations that indigenous peoples have suffered over the years, including forced removals and exterminations.
This list, while not exhaustive, illustrates the versatility of authoritarian projects: their capacity to permeate institutional structures, shape public debate, redirect attention strategically, and mobilize political and economic forces to enable and consolidate setbacks with concrete and lasting impacts on citizenship.
The election of Jair Bolsonaro forced Brazilian civil society to renegotiate priorities and strategies. As discussed above, the time and knowledge accumulated before his inauguration meant this transition could be carried out with a certain degree of planning. At Conectas, the work undertaken between 2019 and 2022 was structured around the complementary axes outlined below.
In general, we have adopted a deliberately supportive stance towards the people and groups most affected by Bolsonaro’s policies, providing support and tools for their protection and joining our efforts with both new and established organizations and initiatives as part of a coordinated and focused effort to restore democracy and human rights.
From a programmatic standpoint, we broadened our mandate to include two themes that had not previously been the focus of our work, but which were central to sustaining the Bolsonarist project: the defense of democracy, especially during election periods, and the fight against disinformation. This process demanded a significant investment of energy in training and knowledge production so that the organization could clearly define its role in each of these agendas. In parallel, we focused on the safeguarding of historic achievements and the defense of institutions—what could even be described as democratic vaccines—recognizing their limitations and structural problems.
To implement this agenda, Conectas sought to strengthen the strategies that had always been part of its repertoire—those that the organization had already mastered—which meant greater assertiveness and effectiveness. In addition, there were national and international strategic litigation and advocacy efforts as well as communications (with special attention to traditional media outlets) and networking.
It is worth taking a moment to outline the litigation work, which gained prominence and expanded significantly during the most critical years of Bolsonaro’s government, when the Judiciary became one of the few remaining channels to contain setbacks. This expansion—from five cases filed in 2018 and nine in 2019, peaking in 2020 and 2021, with 41 and 60 cases respectively— was the result of a conscious decision to respond quickly to institutional and human rights threats. The period demanded “trench litigation.” With the change in the political landscape in 2023, the organization was able to rebalance its actions, reducing the volume of cases and focusing on more impactful, structural cases.
In the context of international political advocacy, it is necessary to identify at least three major successful approaches: first, the use of spaces, fora, and channels to denounce President Jair Bolsonaro and portray him as what he has always been —a real risk to democracy and the defense of rights. This was fundamental because, as seen in the cases of Brazil and other countries, it is common for caricatured authoritarian leaders to be described and treated as eccentric and somehow harmless. The second approach was to diversify or expand the argumentative repertoire, to explore economic and geopolitical interests related to Brazil more strategically and highlight the threat Bolsonaro represented to the business environment and regional stability. Finally, we acted decisively and directly to mobilize support for the integrity of the electoral process and ensure the swift recognition of the 2022 election results thereby reducing the timeframe used by authoritarian leaders to challenge the outcome and generate democratic instability. This strategy proved to be sound and essential in the transition process.
Although it was inevitable that the situation in Brazil would take center stage, this period also strengthened the organization’s capacity to promote strategic exchanges with overseas organizations and to react to and participate in initiatives related to human rights in other territories of the Global South—always a feature of Conectas’ institutional identity. This had been hampered by the state of permanent crisis experienced in Brazil. The experience is undoubtedly a lesson learned and it has reinforced the need to consider that even amid a domestic crisis, it is essential to sustain an international strategy grounded in solidarity and shared learning.
Nationally, a successful strategy was the diversification of institutional alliances. A clear example of how unlikely forces can be decisive in times of crisis was the collaboration with the Center for Research in Health Law at the University of São Paulo (Cepedisa/USP) during the most critical months of the Covid-19 pandemic. This partnership led to the publication of 10 editions of the bulletin Rights in the Pandemic, which mapped, documented, and revealed the existence of an institutional strategy by the Bolsonaro government to promote the spread of the Coronavirus. This study was widely cited3030. “Estudos do Cepedisa/USP sobre a pandemia da covid-19 são mencionados no relatório final da CPI,” Jornal da USP, October 20, 2021, accessed February 2, 2026, https://jornal.usp.br/atualidades/estudos-do-cepedisa-usp-sobre-a-pandemia-da-covid-19-sao-mencionados-no-relatorio-final-da-cpi. as a basis for establishing a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate the failures of the federal government in addressing the Covid-19 pandemic.
The mobilization in decision-making and participatory spaces was supported by the adoption of institutional measures to guarantee the safety and well-being of the team. To this end, we mapped potential vulnerabilities in all areas of the organization, from physical security and the digital space, to the health and well-being of the team, as well as the legal risks arising from our activities. This care was especially relevant during the 2022 election period. While the organization has always maintained a non-partisan stance, it courageously and responsibly embraced the need to join the broad front defending democracy that emerged from the mobilization of diverse societal forces at that time—which proved to be decisive in the defense of democracy.
Jair Bolsonaro was defeated in the 2022 elections and is ineligible to run for office He was also tried and convicted, and is serving a sentence for attempted coup d’état. However, his authoritarian far-right political project remains strong and well-organized, exerting influence in various areas of public administration, notably the Chamber of Deputies—where it holds a strident majority—and the Armed Forces. His social capital is still considerable, and the alliance with the most radical religious sectors and segments of economic power is showing no signs of cracking. While his closest family and political circle is submerged in a fratricidal dispute to determine who will inherit the mantle in the 2026 elections, civil society remains vigilant and active. The work of reconstruction is long and must involve not only recovering lost ground but, above all, pursuing a new horizon of achievements.
The rise of authoritarian projects, as seen in the Brazilian example, does not appear to be an episodic phenomenon, a deviation from the norm, or a passing trend. In recent years, these forces have been able to alter structures once considered unshakeable and to disregard boundaries we had thought inviolable. The recognition that confronting them will be ongoing, however, should lead the human rights movement to go beyond its reactive stance. This may well be a counterintuitive proposal, but it is also an unavoidable one. Experience proves that the definitive overcoming of authoritarianism depends on the deepening of democracy across all its institutional dimensions and on the sustained expansion of rights. Until this objective is achieved, democracy will hang by a thread, and this is the greatest responsibility borne by Brazilian civil society.
