

“WE MUST UNDERSTAND THE HISTORICAL SPAN AND LONGEVITY OF CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENTS”

• *Interview with Sonia Corrêa* •

By *Sur Journal*

The following piece is the result of an interview that Sonia Corrêa¹ kindly granted to Sur Journal in early December 2022. Amidst a full agenda of research work and national and international advocacy on human rights in the field of gender and sexuality policies and with the precision and depth of analysis that she is known for, Sonia spoke with us for two hours (via Zoom) about the ultraconservative plots that have led to the current situation in Brazil and in the world.

She outlined in detail the logical, but not always obvious, chain of global linkages involving governments, religious and secular movements, economic and media sectors in a complex network of political connections that lead to a ferocious far-right. Despite the longevity of this far right, it has made important innovations to not only its mobilization strategy, but also, and more worryingly, another kind of dispute in the field of human rights – one that is epistemological, hermeneutical, and grammatical in nature.

One of the key elements in the historical-political process of the reconfiguration of the transnational conservative movement presented by Sonia Corrêa is the nodal point occupied by Latin America, particularly Brazil, where some key figures of Jair Bolsonaro's government played a leading role in the construction and strengthening of these long-standing international connections.

Sur Journal • How do you explain the scale and the strength of the international conservative movement?

Sonia Corrêa • Here is a first obvious answer: the power and the strength of ultra-right-wing formations and religious ultraconservatism comes from the power of the players involved. We are dealing with forces that are "naturally powerful" – whether we look at the economic elites in these formations (major corporations, for instance) or religious groups, starting with the Catholic Church, which has been, and continues to be, a powerful institution for millennia, and the evangelical religious forces. Of course, evangelical Christianity is much more dispersed and much more heterogeneous, with both large or small churches, but involves very powerful forces, especially in the United States, but also in Brazil. Evangelical sectors have a lot of media power.

Thus, the explanation for the strength of the conservative movement lies in its own power. A power that it wants to preserve either through politics or by resorting to moral politics and imposing rules of conduct. It partially derives its scale from the original power of the forces driving this movement, but there is another element to consider – its historic origins, which is to say, its longevity. The dynamics of ultra-conservative and ultra-right-wing mobilizations are so intense right now that analyses of this phenomenon often lose sight of this dimension.

In Latin America in general, and in Brazil in particular, the narratives that often prevail are those that emphasize the sudden appearance or the surprising surge of far-right forces that we thought had been buried in the past or eradicated by the re-democratization process. In the case of the Southern Cone, the democratization process was highly intense, since it meant the end of military dictatorships. These dictatorships shared ideologies that are not exactly the same, but do have common features with the discourse and the agendas of conservative forces of today. Éric Fassin described Brazil as a laboratory in which fascism, ultra-neoliberalism, racism, and anti-gender ideology have become intermingled.² However, he also points to a previous laboratory, Chile, since neoliberal thought was tested in [Augusto] Pinochet's Chile before being applied to the United States and England during the [Ronald] Reagan and [Margaret] Thatcher administrations, respectively. And the Chilean dictatorship had a very intimate connection with Catholic ultra-conservatism, which was very powerful, even though members of the Church denounced human rights violations. Pinochet's Supreme Court abolished the therapeutic abortion law, designed to save women's lives, shortly before the transition to democracy. In the context of later agreements, Concertación made a pact with the Church not to change this legal definition. This pact was only breached in 2016, when [Michelle] Bachelet proposed a reform in Congress that would allow abortions in cases of rape, risk to life, and fetal anomalies.

It is important to highlight these historic processes because, in Latin America, we went through a kind of democratic vertigo, as Rita Segato explains. We were led to think that these reactionary, ultraconservative forces had retreated to their shadowy dens and stayed there because

democratization had tamed them. This is not so. As [Michel] Foucault wrote a long time ago, the totalitarian temptation always haunts liberal democracies. This “democratic vertigo” that we experienced between the 1980s and the 2010s prevented us from noticing that while we were returning to democracy, reactionary and ultraconservative forces, both in the secular and in the religious realms (Catholic and evangelical), were undergoing a rapid reconfiguration and reorganization process in Europe and the United States, especially in the United States.

This reconfiguration process took place in Europe on a more intellectual level. Until recently, there had not been such an overtly political movement as the one in the United States,³ where it has always been political. It started there in the 1970s as Republican Party leaders’ strategy to regain credibility and political power in the middle of a crisis: Watergate, [Richard] Nixon’s resignation, and the impacts of the Vietnam War. This strategy was based on the need to react to secularization and excessive liberalism of the United States society. It gave rise to the Moral Majority Movement, directed and coordinated by pastor Jerry Falwell, which brought together media-savvy pastors, social and ecclesiastic ultra-Catholic players, as well as powerful secular sectors, CEOs, and think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the International Policy Forum. This was an ultraconservative movement, but a decidedly ecumenic one. It is not surprising that the Supreme Court ruling on the *Roe v. Wade* case of 1973, which established women’s constitutional right to abortion based on the principle of privacy, became one of the first targets of this movement. The Catholic Church has opposed abortion since the 19th century, but it was only in the 1970s that Protestant and Evangelical denominations aligned with this stance.⁴

The 1973 decision was overturned on June 24, 2022, in the judgment of the case of *Dobbs [v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization]*, which made abortion practically illegal in many states of the US. This dramatic setback was the result of these ultraconservative (and increasingly organized) forces’ nearly 50-year investment in restricting the sexual and reproductive autonomy of women and people who gestate. This is the most compelling example I can give of the longevity of this reorganization process and its harmful effects.⁵

From static reaction to “conservative revolution”

The process that led to the overturning of *Roe v. Wade* also illustrates the dynamic that European authors have referred to as the *Gramscian turn of the right*.⁶ This right ceases to be static and reactionary and defends the current order and institutions to become an engine of political mobilization that begins disputing values, political concepts, and common sense on many issues, starting with those on gender and sexuality. A right that starts to challenge feminism and the emerging LGBTQIA+ movement on new perspectives of desire and sexual identity, the right to abortion, and forms of family. In the United States, these disputes later spread to anti-racist struggles, environmental issues, and the defense of migrant persons.

These “threats” were then listed under the proscribed category of “cultural Marxism” that began to circulate intensely after the implosion of socialist regimes in Russia and Eastern

Europe, which left the far right in the United States and elsewhere in the world without a main enemy. The circulation of these ideas was undoubtedly facilitated by the digitalization of politics. However, the most important aspect of this so-called *Gramscian turn of the right* was the relativization of vertical and geopolitical strategies in favor of fierce battles for hearts and minds in order to remove and neutralize "internal enemies" from the political and social order, or even, according to some authors, from Western civilization.

Another strategy of the far right was to densify and diversify the occupation of official political spaces. In the United States, this "new old right" reorganized itself in an absolutely systematic manner,⁷ adopting persistent strategies to occupy the judiciary branch. It managed to appoint judges to the regional circuits of US federal courts and influence the Republican administrations of Reagan, [George] Bush, [George] Bush Jr. and [Donald] Trump. It also radically altered the composition of the Supreme Court – a change that explains the 2022 Dobbs decision. It also invested heavily in conservative academic work, particularly in the legal field.⁸

Transnational conservative alliances

In the 1970s, the United States was a testing ground for the reorganization of ultraconservative forces. However, players on the US scene were surely communicating with European ultraconservatives, particularly in the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher (between 1979 and 1990). In a classic 1980s text about the Thatcher era, Stuart Hall described the events in England as a "conservative revolution".⁹

There were certainly other ties with Europe as well, especially through ultra-Catholic channels, which were always strongly based in Italy, France, and Germany. However, ideas also flowed through the Vatican's own circuits.¹⁰ In 1985, [Joseph Aloisius] Ratzinger expressed strong concern with feminist theories on sexuality, claiming that they potentially threatened the very concept of humanity.¹¹ It should be mentioned, though, that the secular ultraconservative movement also started reorganizing in Europe in the 1970s, orbiting mainly around the Research and Study Group on European Civilization (Groupement de Recherche et d'Études pour la Civilisation Européenne, GRECE), coordinated by Alain de Benoist, whose work undoubtedly made it to the US and other places.

It is important to note that Brazil and Latin America were also on the map of this reorganization process. Here are some examples: in his book *Moral majorities across the Americas: Brazil, the United States, and the creation of the religious right*, Benjamin Cowan examines the relations between Paul Weyrich and Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira, founder of the Brazilian Society of Defense of Tradition, Family and Property (TFP, Sociedade Brasileira de Defesa da Tradição, Família e Propriedade). Weyrich¹² was the founder of The Heritage Foundation, one of the conservative US think tanks created in the 1970s, and the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). The latter is better known in Brazil due to the three meetings it held in the country during the Bolsonaro administration.

Weyrich also founded and headed the International Policy Forum that was highly active on the transnational level, including in Brazil, which he visited several times. He became a close friend of Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira and even helped disseminate *Revolution and Counter-revolution*, which is considered Plínio's masterpiece in the United States. Weyrich also had a solid partnership with William Lind, who would later be known as the inventor of "cultural Marxism", even though he merely compiled and promoted ideas invented by others.¹³ To shed more light on these past events with the lights of the present: Ordo Iuris, the Polish institute dedicated to the elaboration of conservative legal-political texts, was created by the European "Tradition, Family and Property", a branch of the old Brazilian TFP (and not the other way around). It is managed by Brazilians who live in Europe and have connections with Instituto Plínio Corrêa de Oliveira (IPCO).¹⁴

Another character in this plot is Alejandro Chafuen from Argentina, who has lived for a long time in the United States and is younger than Plínio and Weyrich. He ran the Atlas Network (Atlas Economic Research Foundation), which also promoted the so-called moral conservative agenda in conjunction with the defense of ultra-neoliberal policy. Atlas has been and continues to be highly active and influential in Spanish-speaking countries.¹⁵

Another very significant contribution to this scheme is the book *Women of the Right*, of 2012.¹⁶ In the chapter "Transnational Connections Among Right-Wing Women: Brazil, Chile, and the United States," Margaret Power analyzes the visit to the United States in October and November 1964 of Brazilian women who had organized the Marches of Family with God for Liberty (Marchas da Família com Deus pela Liberdade) against the João Goulart administration.

During this trip sponsored by the State Department, these women shared their successful political experience with women activists and leaders in the ultraconservative camp, including Phyllis Schaeffler, widely known as the most anti-feminist and anti-communist voice of her time.

This brief overview confirms that Cowan¹⁷ was right when he said that Brazilian ultra-Catholic thought and other connections with Latin America should be taken into account in the gestation and maturation of the "conservative Christian revolution" in the United States; phantasmagorias and political methods that haunt us today and started to germinate a long time ago.

New factors in the current scenario worth considering are, for one, *globalization* and *the digitalization of politics* after 1990, which intensified these transnational exchanges and geometrically multiplied their webs of connections. Although this new reality in the communications field has been positive for progressive civil society worldwide, it has also been crucial for the ultraconservative forces that now pilot the juggernaut of information and digital wars. Moreover, as I have already mentioned, the *abandonment of the static position* in defense of the current order to engage in the dispute over common sense and

concepts – the *Gramscian turn* – has led the far right to become, as described by Pablo Stefanoni, una *derecha callejera*,¹⁸ or one that takes to the streets.

The "phantom of gender"

It is very significant that "the gender problem" appeared precisely during the transition to globalization and the intensification of communication within the Vatican and in the United Nations – in other words, a transnational arena *par excellence*. Until recently, we had not properly grasped the meaning of this coincidence. We interpreted the Vatican's strong reaction to gender in 1995, in the passage from Cairo to Beijing, as an episode that was "genetically" connected to Catholicism's ultraconservative reaction to the gains and epistemic changes in the area of women's rights, sexuality, and reproduction.¹⁹ This was clearly the case, but this inaugural moment of anti-gender politics should be read as a singular and very important chapter in the reconfiguration of ultraconservatism and the far right.

As I note in the article "A política do gênero" (The politics of gender),²⁰ the Vatican did not show the same fury on gender in Beijing as it had in New York six months earlier, but this fury would be rekindled in the Beijing+5 processes (1999-2000). Between the two events, systematic intellectual work was initiated in order to consolidate the accusatory tone of "gender ideology".²¹ This language was first used in the ultraconservative world in an interview with Ratzinger published in 1997.²² Monsignor Michel Schooyans then took it up again in the book *L'Évangile face au désordre mondial* (The Gospel Confronting World Disorder), published that same year²³ and, soon after, in a 1998 document written by Peruvian bishops.²⁴ Even though Dale O'Leary does not use the term in his book *The Gender Agenda* (1997), the substantive content is the same. These three seminal publications associate gender, or "gender ideology", with Marxism.

The next step was the incorporation of this language by the Vatican, where theological reference documents would later be written about the "gender threat". The most important ones are *Lexicon – Pontifical Council for the Family* (2003) and the Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World (2004).²⁵ One year after this letter, Ratzinger became Pope and in the papal homily for Christmas in 2008, he established, for the first time, a connection between the "effects of gender ideology" and the destruction of "the ecology of man".²⁶ He then reiterated this view at the UN General Assembly of 2009, where he associated gender with the destruction of forests.

In 2013, broad social mobilizations erupted in Europe and Latin America that constituted a kind of "the people against gender" scenario. In Europe, the icon of this new era was the organization La Manif Pour Tous²⁷ in Paris, which launched the "girls wear pink and boys wear blue" aesthetic norm in the world. That same year, two bastions of anti-gender politics were also created: the Citizen Go digital platform in Spain and the Ordo Iuris institute in Poland.

In Latin America, the offensives were sectoral at first. In 2013, there were attacks on “gender” and “ideology” in the Brazilian National Education Plan (PNE, Plano Nacional de Educação), like ones that had happened in Paraguay the year before. Also, a resolution on sexual orientation, gender identity, and human rights was the subject of heated debate at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. Although these attacks in the field of education were not immediately visible, they would have catastrophic effects on educational policy and the school environment.²⁸

That was when these mobilizations multiplied in the region, varying in intensity depending on the context. Here, I would like to highlight three characteristics or aspects. Although anti-gender offensives targeted issues that conservative groups had always opposed, they should not be interpreted as “more of the same”. This is because, among other reasons, *they are no longer exclusively or predominantly religious* or cannot be explained as mere backlash or “effects of fundamentalisms”; they are attacks by heterogeneous, intersectional groups. As I have said, these hydras have many heads that move in several directions and drink from contradictory ideological sources, which makes them more difficult to understand.²⁹

Furthermore, in Latin America, *there is a very solid connection between gender and Marxism*. Here, while the specter of “gender” triggers moral panic in relation to sexual disorders (particularly pedophilia), the phantom of Marxism stirs up deep layers of anticommunist sentiment and the rejection of egalitarianism, which we thought had been suppressed. Finally, *these cyclones have clung to high-intensity electoral dynamics to create the perfect storm to bring the far right to power*. Brazil is the most emblematic and dramatic example of this because it introduced gender ideology into state policy.³⁰

I have just described an “ideal type” of Gramscian style anti-gender politics: broad, heterogeneous social mobilizations against “gender” or “gender ideology” that are often connected to political and electoral dynamics. However, things do not always happen like that, not even in Latin America. In Paraguay and Guatemala, conservative governments that did not rely on anti-gender mobilizations to get elected absorbed and legitimized their positions and converted them into public policy.

There were no anti-gender mobilizations like the ones that elected Trump in 2016 either (although there was a high degree of misogyny, racism, and LGBTQIA+phobia). Even so, attacks against “gender” in the form of restrictions on the rights of trans people quickly appeared and, since then, have escalated rapidly. When Putin came to power in 2003, the anti-gender offensives of today were still being gestated. A few years later, in an alliance with the head of the Orthodox Church, Putin adopted openly homophobic discourses and policies, later becoming an energetic global spokesperson for anti-gender ideology and, according to many studies, a financier of wars against gender in Europe.³¹

It is very important to understand these differences and nuances. Anti-gender politics can be found in the Americas, Europe, the post-Soviet world, Africa, Asia (Taiwan

and, perhaps, Korea), and Oceania (Australia and, apparently, New Zealand), but they are not the same everywhere.

Sur • Coming back to Brazil, what is the country's place in the map of this reconfiguration?

S.C. • Lengthy processes in our political history explain the inertial ultraconservatism of society that has been roused by the attacks in the last decade. But before uncovering these old tracks, one must say that in Brazil and Latin America in general, the wars against gender were favored by the intersection of three long-term systemic trends.

The first is the *re-democratization* process that marked the region's landscape over the last four decades, especially the shortcomings of the democratic regimes that emerged from it: namely, the vestiges of social and institutional authoritarianism and the persistence of violence related to the economy of drug trafficking and the war on drugs (particularly important in Brazil). The second was the *continual penetration of neoliberal thought* inaugurated by Pinochet in Chile and its multiple impacts: social inequality and precariousness, erosion of the political sphere, and the reconfiguration of subjectivities. Finally, one must consider the *growing politicization of religious ultraconservatism*. The Vatican's return to orthodoxy had strong impacts on progressive Catholic groups and consolidated the orthodox infrastructure that supports the offensives of today. However, since the 1980s, we have also witnessed the rapid expansion of Christian fundamentalism, which ended up dragging other denominations into dogmatism. Furthermore, it is well-known that the theology of prosperity deployed by some evangelical groups fueled the neoliberalization of social life.³²

When we go back in history, in the 1930s, Brazil was home to a broad fascist movement with plenty of transnational ties, such as the Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB, *Ação Integralista Brasileira*).³³ In spite of its extreme nationalism, the Integralist movement had connections with Europe, where it had strong ties with Salazarism and the fascists in Italy and many other countries.³⁴ Integralism was a "clerical" sort of fascism. Not only were Plínio Salgado and Gustavo Barroso staunch Catholics, but their ideological narrative was built on Christian (Catholic) concepts of integrity and social hierarchy; many clergymen were members of the AIB.³⁵ Caldeira Netto adds that Protestants and Kardecists also joined the AIB – in other words, it had an ecumenic side that was not all that noticeable at first.

The resilience of anticommunist sentiment in Brazil also has a long history. It dates to the First Republic, grew during the *Estado Novo*, and was repeatedly triggered throughout the Cold War, particularly among the military and the middle classes, until it finally led to the coup d'état in 1964. As also has been shown by several researchers, the exchanges between Brazil and the US continued after 1985 in the field of strategic and military studies and opened channels through which the theses and new formulas of the "conservative revolution" created in the 1970s circulated intensively.³⁶

In Brazilian military circles, the ghost of “cultural Marxism”, later associated with “gender”, began to circulate very early on. This should not be interpreted as a mere transposition of *gringo* discourse to Brazil, but rather as the *aggiornamento*, or updating, of radically anticommunist views in military circles. It was not difficult at all to persuade these sectors of the existence of internal enemies, for this doctrine had already been solidly established among us since the days of Golbery do Couto e Silva.³⁷ And, as noted by Cowan in his interview with *Revista Pesquisa Fapesp*, an association between communism and “sexual debauchery” had already been made during the dictatorship period, but it did not flourish.³⁸ In the political and cultural context of the 2010s, however, the internal enemy took on many faces: feminists, LGBTQIA+ activists, anti-racist, and anti-prohibitionist movements – that is, the whole squad of “abominable characters threatening upstanding citizens.”

As explained by Camila Rocha,³⁹ in the late 2000s, Brazil was included in the web that had long been producing and disseminating an extensive amount of classic texts and updated arguments in defense of neoliberalism, but also right-wing libertarianism. That was when new liberal institutes emerged, such as the Instituto Millennium (Millennium Institute) and liberal grassroots mobilization movements, such as Movimento Brasil Livre (MBL), Vem pra Rua, and Estudantes Livres. These actors revived liberal voices that had been ostracized in the democratization process and promoted discourses that valued meritocracy and entrepreneurship and vilified income transfer and affirmative action policies.

Among these complex intersections, it is important to note the contributions of the perennialist or traditionalist currents, of which Olavo de Carvalho was a spokesman, which early on propagated ideologic codes of the “conservative revolution” underway in the US and in Europe. In this brief overview, perhaps the most important thing we should ask ourselves is how and why this ideologic, spiritualist, and eschatological narrative became so socially and politically influential that it was able to keep a firm hold on Brazilian foreign policy until 2021.⁴⁰

It is no easy feat to precisely recall how these long-standing paths converge with the recent dynamics of national politics. But it would not be rash to suggest that these intersections have been carefully woven since the end of the 2000s and took form during the crisis of legitimacy of the Brazilian Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) administrations, which began in 2013 and led to the impeachment of Dilma [Rousseff] and later developments. Bolsonaro announced that he would run for president in 2014 and it is my interpretation that he launched his campaign with his ignoble speech during the impeachment vote in 2016. I suspect that it was in this complex and turbid context that Bolsonaro assumed the role of leader of the reconfiguration of neoconservatism and the far right in Brazil. It is quite significant that immediately after the scene of the impeachment vote, he went to Israel to be rebaptized.⁴¹ Israel was not only under the rule of far-right figure [Benjamin] Netanyahu, but it has always been a hub for connections with US and British ultraconservative forces and the right. I would say that this trip meant both embodiment (as a leader) and transnationalization.

Then, in 2017, the anti-gender ghost escaped the field of education and began to haunt other territories, such as visual and performing arts, as seen in the attack on the Queer Museum. At the end of that year, Citizen Go staged a campaign against Judith Butler's visit to Brazil and, in a demonstration in São Paulo, burned her effigy as a "witch", clearly evoking the acts of faith ceremonies of the Inquisition: this act was an attack on theory and the production of knowledge on gender. In our study in 2020,⁴² we interpreted this incident as a pilot experiment for the 2018 presidential election, when the anti-gender cyclone grew in scale, before being incorporated into the government's grammar in 2019.

Brazil as a hub for the coordination of the far right forces today

Considering everything I have said, it is not surprising at all that the two most important heads of state at Bolsonaro's inauguration in 2018 were Netanyahu and [Viktor] Orbán. In other words, it's not that Brazil was becoming a coordination hub for transnational far-right forces, but rather that the right had already started weaving these connections before the election. Prior to [Jair Bolsonaro's] inauguration, Eduardo Bolsonaro organized the Foz Conservative Summit, attended by José Antonio Kast and other figures of the far right from the region.⁴³

From that point on, the transnationalization effort would visibly become more intense, not only because Bolsonaro and his sons met with Donald Trump and Steve Bannon more than once in the United States, but also because Brazil became a mandatory stopover for ultraconservative and far-right figures. Since 2019, CPAC has held three meetings in the country, and we have had a visit from members of the Spanish party VOX. In 2021, Beatrix von Storch,⁴⁴ leader of Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), the German far right party, met with Bolsonaro;⁴⁵ and a pair of German anti-vaccine activists, who were later arrested, met with Damares Alves and also with Bolsonaro.⁴⁶ In 2022, Katalin Novák, the new president of Hungary, came to Brazil, and Valerie Huber, who had been the special envoy of the Trump administration for health matters, also visited twice.

The defense of the ultraconservative agenda and the strengthening of new ties were blatantly obvious in our foreign policy.⁴⁷ Brazil participated very actively in two platforms created by the Trump administration: the International Alliance for Religious Freedom⁴⁸ and the so-called Geneva Consensus, a club of conservative states that defend that there is only one family model and are radically opposed to reproductive rights and abortion. With Trump's defeat, Brazil became the coordinator of this platform until November 2022, when, anticipating Brazil's departure after Lula's election (which it did in January 2023), the government passed the baton on to Hungary in a ceremony held in Brasília.

In his two years as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernesto Araújo surely established important international connections using state resources that merit further investigation. When he left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2021, Angela Gandra, the National Secretary of the Family, gained prominence as a shadow minister for

conservative topics, undoubtedly taking inspiration from the role that Katalin Novák played when she was Hungary's Minister for Family Affairs.⁴⁹

Most of Gandra's activities⁵⁰ were dedicated to getting more countries to join the Geneva Consensus. Her efforts were not very successful. Only Guatemala's adhesion went through. Colombia entered the Consensus in April 2022, but withdrew soon after Gustavo Petro was elected president. It is important to mention that in these missions, closer ties were also established with countries in the Persian Gulf⁵¹ regarding the conservative agenda on family and women's place in society.

Sur • How does this transnational coordination of the far right affect work to protect and defend human rights?

S.C. • This is a very important question that I have thought a lot about, but not as much as I would like to.⁵² When ultraconservative forces started gaining strength in Latin America, the “anti-rights” nomenclature was invented to define them – in other words, a strategy that uses semantic inversion to unmask the fallacy of their self-definition as “pro-life”, “pro-family”, “pro-children”.

This nomenclature was immediately adopted and spread to the rest of the world. It is very attractive because it makes the problem easier to identify by stating that these forces threaten our rights, which we won through great effort over the course of the re-democratization process in the region. And I must say that it is not entirely wrong to say so, since ultraconservative forces openly attack what they define as “new rights”, which are generally those related to gender, sexuality, and reproduction. However, I believe that using the term “anti-rights” to describe our issue is problematic because it does not cover elements that are far from trivial.

In the West, the Catholic Church has historically been an unquestionable source of legal thought. One just has to recall that until the 19th century, in Portugal, Spain, and the territories they colonized, civil law and canon law were one and the same. There are quite a few genealogical connections between conceptions of human rights from the Enlightenment and legal assumptions of Christianity.

Turning our attention to the present, the ultraconservative movement of the United States has greatly invested in the production of “knowledge” or ultraconservative thought in the legal field and in training legal professionals in strategic human rights litigation. This was reflected in the overturning of *Roe v. Wade*, but also in the document produced by the Commission on Unalienable Rights,⁵³ created by the Trump administration, which was released in July 2022. Its preparation was coordinated by Mary Ann Glendon, an ultraconservative legal scholar from Harvard who led the Vatican delegation at the Beijing Conference and was later the ambassador of the Bush administration to the Vatican.

This text is a masterpiece of so-called US originalism, a reinterpretation of law in the light of the "original legal tradition" of the US founding fathers, which, according to the conservatives, should be preserved as such. In this view, there is no room for "new rights". Plenty of publications in the United States have discussed the problems of the originalism expressed in the Dobbs ruling, including an article by Noah Feldman, a progressive legal scholar.⁵⁴ According to Feldman, this ruling abandons and vilifies the interpretative epistemology of contemporary constitutionalism, which conceives constitutions as legal references that can and should be continually expanded through reinterpretations based on the principles of equality and freedom. In other words, an expansive framework of constitutionalist interpretation that also applies to the jurisprudence on human rights as it has developed since the Second World War, particularly after the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.

It was this broadening of interpretation that allowed, throughout the 1990s, a series of situations of violations and needs for protection and prevention to be included in fundamental human rights premises that were not there before. This can be seen in the application of human rights to racism and social inequality.⁵⁵ The questioning of sexual binarism enshrined in human rights instruments is another example, since it made room for the recognition of violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity; Advisory Opinion 24 of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights is a solid example of that.

In the realm of human rights, the goal of these forces is to restrain and, if possible, abolish this interpretative logic. In other words, return to a literal legal interpretation whereby human rights are legitimate as long as they correspond to the definitions of declarations and conventions as they were originally approved. This means that these forces are not "anti-rights"; instead, they have a specific understanding of human and constitutional rights that not only diverges from but also rejects the open epistemology I mentioned.

In other words, there is a (quite ferocious) dispute in the field of human rights. It clearly appears in the area of interpretive epistemology, but can also be seen in another aspect of the ultraconservative conception of "rights," which is the attachment to hierarchy and the aversion to freedom or autonomy as the founding principle of human rights. Many prerogatives in the progressive sphere, such as the legitimate expression of autonomy, are seen by ultraconservatism as a justification for tutelage or even charity. This distortion became quite evident in the reconfiguration of the human rights policy under Bolsonaro.⁵⁶

Sur • What are the main challenges that the human rights movement, particularly the feminist and LGBTQIA+ movements, face in relation to the agenda of this conservative movement?

S.C. • The first challenge is to situate our analyses and activism strategies in relation to this lengthy temporality typical of ultraconservative forces, the Catholic Church being a case in point. Progressive movements have a hard time understanding and adjusting to this

longevity. Our political imagination is populated with desires for swift changes and the idea of revolution. It has always been this way, but this has now been aggravated by the way the digitalization of life and politics has accelerated everything. Events of yesterday no longer matter; topics that disappear from Twitter are no longer relevant. This perception and way of acting and reacting contrasts greatly with the very long-term strategies designed and implemented by ultraconservatism. On the surface, these forces are playing a game of “infocination” and acceleration.

We need to refine our “historical patience” skills, to use an old term. Say our intention is to obtain legislative change on abortion; while we make a three-year plan, the Catholic Church and other forces opposed to abortion make plans for a 30 to 50-year window. This was the timeframe of the actions that led to the overturning of *Roe v. Wade*. However, there is yet another problem: sustaining long-term struggles and processes requires sustainable resources. Who will sustain them in the progressive camp? How do we overcome the brutal inequality that exists between us and them in terms of available time, institutional infrastructure, and financial resources? There are no easy answers to that question.

Sur • Lastly, how can we resist the “conservative revolution”?

S.C. • The first order of business is to recognize that it is underway and gained a lot of ground, and that the forces driving it will not back down in the near future. We must recognize that the complexity and longevity of this revolution require new lenses, or at least adjusted lenses for interpretation. More specifically, we must acknowledge that the grammar of human rights and their interpretive epistemology are in dispute. This is happening both in the constitutional and the human rights fields.

It is crucial for all people and movements engaged in debates on democratic constitutionalism and human rights to be clear about this. What is at stake is, in fact, a dispute over the epistemological conception of fundamental rights and especially whether the interpretation of existing rules should be literal or transformative. This dispute is a lot more visible in the United States because originalism has gained strength and legitimacy and penetrated legal institutions, as seen in the *Dobbs* ruling. Although the ramifications of these disputes can be seen everywhere, we have hardly begun to discuss the implications of this dispute in Brazil, even when some of the more emblematic figures of the ultraconservative forces that rose to power in 2018 are strongly aligned with these regressive interpretations (whether they are originalist or neo-Thomist).⁵⁷

I believe that this is the frontier or, better yet, the war trench we have ahead of us. We must transmit broader information to the human rights field about the meaning of this epistemological war. The possibility of an expanded interpretation of human rights did not exist when the Declaration was adopted in 1948; it is the result of long, hard work on human rights as a transnational political agenda and on post-war democratic constitutionalism. This is the approach that is now under attack and that must be defended.



Sonia Corrêa.

Source: Personal archive photo.

• • •

*Interview conducted by Maryuri Mora Grisales in December 2022.
Original in Portuguese. Translated by Luis Misiara. Proofread by Karen Lang.*

NOTES

1 • Sonia Corrêa is currently the coordinator of Sexuality Policy Watch (SPW).

2 • Éric Fassin, “Brasil: o laboratório interseccional do neoliberalismo.” *Cult*, October 22, 2019, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://revistacult.uol.com.br/home/neoliberalismo-interseccional/>.

3 • In Europe, they had the support and contribution of ultra-Catholicism and the Vatican itself, which underwent a conservative restoration in 1979, when Wojtyła became Pope (John Paul

II) and then appointed cardinal Ratzinger to lead the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. It is worth noting that both were intellectual figures, particularly Ratzinger, who had had a long academic career before arriving at the Vatican.

4 • There are records showing that, for instance, the Southern Baptist Convention, one of the most powerful ones in the United States, did not radically oppose the right to abortion before *Roe v. Wade*, but took the lead in anti-abortion mobilizations a

few years later.

5 • See the note and a compilation on the Dobbs decision made by SPW at: “A decisão ‘Gilead’: uma compilação,” Sexuality Policy Watch, July 15, 2022, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://sxpolitics.org/ptbr/a-decisao-gilead-uma-compilacao/12706>.

6 • See Sonia Corrêa, David Paternotte and Roman Kuhar, “A globalização das campanhas anti-gênero.” Sexuality Policy Watch, June 25, 2018, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://sxpolitics.org/ptbr/a-globalizacao-das-campanhas-anti-genero/8513>.

7 • Ver Dan Allosso, “12. The New Right” in *US History II: Gilded Age to Present* (Bemidji: Bemidji State University, 2020), accessed January 4, 2023, <https://mlpp.pressbooks.pub/ushistory2/chapter/the-new-right/>.

8 • In 2005, Ives Gandra Martins translated and published *Direito Fundamental à Vida*, a nearly 1,000-page book with articles written by the American conservative academic complex about abortion and related topics, which was clearly influential among the forces opposing the right to abortion in Brazil. The text is available in PDF format at the Digital Library of the Superior Court of Justice.

9 • Stuart Hall, *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left* (United Kingdom: Verso, 2021).

10 • In their masterful book about John Paul II, Bernstein and Politti report that during the Reagan administration, CIA head William Chase visited the Vatican and discussed geopolitical strategies on Poland and Nicaragua with Wojtyła. Carl Bernstein and Marco Politti, *Sua Santidade - João Paulo II e a História Oculta de Nosso Tempo* (São Paulo: Objetiva, 1996).

11 • Fernando Geronazzo, “Livro-entrevista de Ratzinger sobre a fé e os desafios do pós-Concílio é reeditado no Brasil.” O São Paulo, December 18, 2021, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://osaopaulo.org.br/destaque/livro-entrevista-de-ratzinger-sobre-a-fe-e-os-desafios-do-pos-concilio-e-reeditado-no-brasil/>.

12 • Weyrich was an American ultra-Catholic who

left the Catholic Church after the Second Vatican Council and joined a Greek Orthodox Church so that he would not have to submit to the reforms proposed by John XXIII.

13 • See “Guerras culturais: uma batalha pela alma do Brasil”, Podcast by Globo Play - Pablo Ortellado, 2022, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://globoplay.globo.com/podcasts/guerras-culturais-uma-batalha-pela-alma-do-brasil/bb970d66-e4d0-4087-bb44-84436175ddd8/>. Directed by University of São Paulo (USP) professor and reporter Elisa Martins.

14 • Between 2007 and 2012-2013, IPCO was the main propagator of the ghost of “gender ideology” via online media.

15 • Chafuen was in Brazil in 2019, when he took part in a debate with Brasil Paralelo.

16 • Kathleen M. Blee and Sandra McGee Deutsch, *Women of the Right: Comparisons and Interplay Across Borders* (University Park: PSU Press, 2012).

17 • We recommend the interview Benjamin A. Cowan gave to Pesquisa Fapesp: Glenda Mezarobba, “Benjamin A. Cowan: O Brasil e a nova direita.” Pesquisa Fapesp, July 2021, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://revistapesquisa.fapesp.br/benjamin-a-cowan-o-brasil-e-a-nova-direita/>.

18 • Pablo Stefanoni, *¿La rebeldía se volvió de derecha?: Cómo el antiprogresismo y la anticorrección política están construyendo un nuevo sentido común (y por qué la izquierda está perdiendo la iniciativa)* (Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2021).

19 • For a more detailed analysis of this episode, see Sonia Corrêa, “A ‘política do gênero’: um comentário genealógico,” *Cadernos Pagu* 53 (2018), accessed January 27, 2023, <https://periodicos.sbu.unicamp.br/ojs/index.php/cadpagu/article/view/8653407>.

20 • *Ibid.*

21 • It should be noted that the terminology of gender ideology can be found in seminal feminist texts of the 1970s, such as the classic article by Monique Wittig, “Não se nasce mulher,” in *Pensamento feminista: Conceitos fundamentais*, org. Heloisa Buarque de Holanda (Rio de Janeiro: Bazar do Tempo, 2019), accessed January 27, 2023,

https://www.mpba.mp.br/sites/default/files/biblioteca/direitos-humanos/direitos-das-mulheres/obras_digitalizadas/heloisa-buarque-de-hollanda-pensamento-feminista_-conceitos-fundamentais-bazar-do-tempo-_2019_.pdf.

22 • Interview by German journalist Peter Seewald with Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger (Benedict XVI) in 1997, when he was still Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The interview was published as a book: Joseph Ratzinger and Peter Seewald, *O Sal da Terra: O Cristianismo e a Igreja Católica no limiar do terceiro milênio* (Rio de Janeiro: Imago, 1997).

23 • Michel Schooyans, *L'Évangile face au désordre mondial* (Paris: Fayard, 1997), accessed January 27, 2023, <https://excerpts.numilog.com/books/9782706251467.pdf>. There is an important, but unexplored connection between ultraconservatism in Brazil and in Europe, since Schoovans lived in Brazil between 1959 and 1969. While in the country, he published the book *O comunismo e o futuro da igreja* (Communism and the future of the church), a title that appears at the top of the list when one Googles the monsignor's name.

24 • It is no coincidence that right after the text written by the Peruvian bishops, Latin American authors and translators made substantial contributions to the preparation and promotion of anti-gender phantoms. The most famous examples are Alejandro Ordoñez from Colombia and Jorge Scala, Agustín Laje, and Nicolas Marques from Argentina.

25 • "Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World", Vatican, 2004, accessed January 27, 2023, https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20040731_collaboration_en.html. For more details on this genealogy, we recommend reading the entry on "Ideologia de Gênero" in *Termos Ambíguos do Debate Político Atual: Pequeno Dicionário que Você Não Sabia que Existia*, coord. Sonia Corrêa (Rio de Janeiro: Associação Brasileira

Interdisciplinar de Aids - ABIA, 2022). For a more detailed review, we recommend the article by Rogério Junqueira "Ideologia de gênero: Uma ofensiva transnacional", *Tempo & Presença* no. 32 (June 2019), accessed January 27, 2023, http://www.koinonia.org.br/tpdigital/uploads/Ideologia-de-Genero-KN_out_2018.pdf.

26 • "Missa na solenidade da epifania do Senhor: Homilia do Santo Padre Bento XVI," Vatican, January 6, 2008, accessed January 23, 2023, https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/pt/homilies/2008/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20080106_epifania.html.

27 • La Manif Pour Tous, Homepage, 2023, accessed January 23, 2023, <https://www.lamanifpourtous.fr>.

28 • For more information about the long-term developments of these attacks in Brazil, see: *Ofensivas Reacionárias, Resistências Democráticas e Anúncios pelo Direito Humanos à Educação*, org. Denise Carreira and Bárbara Lopes (São Paulo: Ação Educativa, 2022), accessed January 27, 2023, https://generoeeducacao.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Livro-2022_GÊNERO-E-EDUCAÇÃO-ofensivas-reacionárias-resistências-democráticas-e-anúncios-pelo-direito-humano-à-educação.pdf.

29 • See Sonia Corrêa, "Ideologia de gênero: assim surgiu o espantinho." *Outras Palavras*, May 14, 2021, accessed January 23, 2023, <https://outraspalavras.net/direita-assanhada/ideologia-de-genero-assim-surgiu-o-espantinho/>.

30 • "Ofensivas Antigênero no Brasil: políticas de Estado, legislação, mobilização social", *Sexuality Policy Watch*, 2021, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://sxpolitics.org/ptbr/ofensivas-antigenero-no-brasil-politicas-de-estado-legislacao-mobilizacao-social/12156>.

31 • See, for instance, "Tip of the Iceberg: Religious extremist - Funders against Human Rights for Sexuality & Reproductive Health in Europe," *European Parliamentary Forum for Sexual and Reproductive Rights*, June 15, 2021, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://www.epfweb.org/node/837>.

32 • In the preface of the e-book containing summaries of regional case studies in Portuguese, Sonia and Richard Parker discussed these structural conditions at greater length. See *Políticas Antigênero na América Latina: Estudos de Caso - Versões Condensadas*, ed. Sonia Corrêa (Rio de Janeiro: Associação Brasileira Interdisciplinar de AIDS - ABIA, 2021), accessed January 27, 2023, <https://sxpolitics.org/GPAL/uploads/resumos-pt/E-book-Resumos-PT-02082021.pdf>.

33 • See Leandro Pereira Gonçalves and Odilon Caldeira Neto, *O Fascismo dos Camisas Verdes* (São Paulo: FGV Editora, 2020), accessed January 27, 2023, <https://editora.fgv.br/produto/o-fascismo-em-camisas-verdes-do-integralismo-aoneointegralismo-3544>.

34 • Caldeira Netto lists organic contacts in Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Philadelphia, Geneva, Zurich, Warsaw, and Berlin, as well as connections in New York, Washington, Paris, Santiago de Chile, Tokyo, and Las Palmas.

35 • The most emblematic – and intriguing – case is that of Dom Helder Câmara, who was once the private secretary of Plínio Salgado.

36 • See Lucas Pedretti, “Os ecos do Orvil em 2021, o livro secreto da ditadura.” Agência Pública, August 30, 2021, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://apublica.org/2021/08/os-ecos-do-orvil-em-2021-o-livro-secreto-da-ditadura/>; and João Cezar de Castro, *Guerra Cultural e Retórica do ódio: Crônicas de um Brasil Pós-político* (Goiânia: Editora e Livraria Caminhos, 2021).

37 • Ricardo Abramovay, “O 8 de Janeiro, os militares e a Amazônia.” Piauí, January 20, 2023, accessed January 23, 2023, <https://piaui.folha.uol.com.br/o-8-de-janeiro-os-militares-e-amazonia/>.

38 • See Mezarobba, “Benjamin A. Cowan, 2021.”

39 • Camila Rocha, *Menos Marx, mais Mises: O liberalismo e a nova direita no Brasil* (São Paulo: Todavia, 2021).

40 • It is important to emphasize the influence Olavo de Carvalho had with Ernesto Araújo, Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Bolsonaro administration, with the latter stating that the works

of Olavo de Carvalho “inspire and contribute” to the formulation of “policies and decision-making”. Jamil Chade, “Chanceler diz que obras de Olavo de Carvalho inspiram política.” UOL, September 10, 2020, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://noticias.uol.com.br/colunas/jamil-chade/2020/09/10/chanceler-diz-que-obras-de-olavo-de-carvalho-inspiram-politica.htm>.

41 • Bolsonaro is Catholic, but also Evangelical: “Jair Bolsonaro confessa Jesus Cristo e se batiza no rio Jordão”. Guiame, May 12, 2016, accessed January 05, 2023, <https://guiame.com.br/gospel/videos/jair-bolsonaro-confessa-jesus-cristo-e-se-batiza-no-rio-jordao-assista.html>.

42 • Políticas Antigênero na América Latina... (2021).

43 • See André Barrocal, “Quem é quem na cúpula direitista das Américas.” Carta Capital, December 7, 2018, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/mundo/quem-e-quem-na-cupula-direitista-das-americas/>.

44 • Mariana Sanches, “Beatrix von Storch: quem é a líder da extrema-direita alemã que se reuniu com Bolsonaro”. BBC, July 26, 2021, accessed January 13, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-57978671>.

45 • Flávia Said, “Bolsonaro se reuniu com deputada alemã da ultradireita”. Metrôpoles, July 26, 2021, accessed January 13, 2023, <https://www.metropoles.com/brasil/politica-brasil/bolsonaro-se-reuniu-com-deputada-alema-da-ultradireita>.

46 • Deutsche Welle, “Bolsonaro recebe negacionistas alemães em Brasília.” Carta Capital, September 23, 2021, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/bolsonaro-recebe-negacionistas-alemaes-em-brasilia/>.

47 • Since 2019, in international arenas such as the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) in the UN Human Rights Council, Brazil not only systematically aligned its votes those of with conservative governments on topics such as gender, sexual education, and health and reproductive rights, but also abstained from important votes, such as the condemnation of Iran for state violence

against the demonstrations protesting the death of Mahsa Amini. The country also used these arenas as an opportunity to strengthen ties with Hungary and Poland, for instance, and establish new connections with conservative states, including non-Christian ones.

48 • "Brasil prepara aliança com EUA por defesa da liberdade religiosa," Folha de S. Paulo, September 12, 2019, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2019/09/brasil-prepara-alianca-com-eua-por-defesa-da-liberdade-religiosa.shtml>.

49 • In Hungary, Foreign Affairs took care of other policy areas, and Novak handled conservative policy on family, gender, and abortion. Gandra also started doing this kind of diplomatic work.

50 • For more information on the diplomatic efforts of the former Secretary of the Family, read the document sent to the working groups for the transition to the Lula administration by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship. "Diplomacia Paralela Ultraconservadora: gênero, política moral, familismo e novas motivações para relações interestatais," Sexuality Policy Watch, January 24, 2023, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://sxpolitics.org/ptbr/diplomacia-paralela-ultraconservadora-genero-politica-moral-familismo-e-novas-motivacoes-para-relacoes-interestatais/12940>.

51 • This connection brings to mind the relations in the 1990s that feminists such as Sonia Corrêa referred to as the *unholy alliance*: the partnership between the Vatican, associated Christian states, and Muslim countries.

52 • See Laura Murray, "Missing the point: A conversation with Sonia Corrêa about the emergence and complexities of anti-gender politics at the intersections of human rights and health," *Global Public Health: An International Journal for Research, Policy and Practice* 17, no. 11 (2022): 3243-3253, accessed January 27, 2023, <https://sxpolitics.org/global-public-health-journal-human-rights-missing-the-point-a-conversation-with-sonia>

[corrêa-about-the-emergence-and-complexities-of-anti-gender-politics-at-the-intersections/22735](https://sxpolitics.org/global-public-health-journal-human-rights-missing-the-point-a-conversation-with-sonia-corrêa-about-the-emergence-and-complexities-of-anti-gender-politics-at-the-intersections/22735).

53 • "Report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights," Commission on Unalienable Rights, 2020, accessed January 13, 2023, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Draft-Report-of-the-Commission-on-Unalienable-Rights.pdf>.

54 • Noah Feldman, "Ending Roe Is Institutional Suicide for Supreme Court". Bloomberg, June 24, 2022, accessed January 13, 2023, <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-24/supreme-court-abortion-ruling-in-dobbs-is-institutional-suicide?srnd=premium>.

55 • The Convention against racism was one of the first to be approved in the international human rights system (1951). However, in the last three decades, the original parameters have been rendered more complex and enlarged to integrate the theory about the systemic nature of racism, as well as the new logic of intersectionality.

56 • According to Sonia, in a document sent to the transition working group of the Ministry of Human Rights and Citizenship, the following terms were analyzed: "Far-right thought deeply penetrated the grammar and design of human rights policy. This meant a substantive change in the understanding of human rights, summarized in the following statement by former Minister Damares Alves: 'Let me say two words: promotion and protection. The Bolsonaro administration does not promote this agenda, it protects this group... (LGBTQIA+ people). We don't promote, we protect.' This vision radically diverges from the human rights paradigm that has evolved since 1948, its most robust manifestation being the parameters of integrity and indivisibility legitimized in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna (1993). On the one hand, these parameters establish the protection of people from violations and discrimination, but they also affirm the right to freedom, autonomy, and the personal prerogatives of individuals and groups so they may associate freely, express their opinions and worldviews, and decide for

themselves what they will do with their lives and bodies. Clearly, this second set of non-negotiable human rights principles has been abandoned in the last four years and needs to be restored." For a more elaborate analysis of this reconfiguration, see João Gabriel Maracci and Marco Aurelio Maximo Prado, "Ofensivas Antigênero e a Depuração dos Direitos Humanos como Política de Estado no Brasil," *Estudos e Pesquisas em Psicologia* 22, no. 4 (2022), accessed January 27, 2023, <https://www.e-publicacoes.uerj.br/index>.

php/revispsi/article/view/71643/44113.

57 • Examples of this include Ives Gandra Martins and the large group around him, which includes Rodrigo Pedrosa and Congresswoman Cris Tonietto, among others. But one could also mention Centro Dom Bosco, a conservative Catholic legal think tank, and the Brazilian Association of Conservative Jurists. There are also law schools and courses that have not been sufficiently mapped out, but currently operate as chains of transmission of these approaches.



"This journal is published under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License"